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INCENTIVES FOR CONSERVATION
EASEMENTS: THE CHARITABLE
DEDUCTION OR A BETTER WAY
DANIEL HALPERIN*
I
INTRODUCTION
The Internal Revenue Code allows a charitable income-tax deduction for a
“qualified conservation contribution,”1 known, more colloquially, as a
conservation easement. To be eligible for the deduction, the easement must be
“granted in perpetuity” to a “qualified organization, exclusively for
conservation purposes.”2 The 1980 change in the tax law to codify this deduction
is generally recognized as being the factor largely responsible for the
tremendous growth in the donation of conservation easements.3 The Land Trust
Alliance, an umbrella organization for land trusts, (like other defenders of the
tax deduction) has pointed to the millions of acres now protected by
conservation easements as evidence of the tax-expenditure program’s enormous
success.4 What is striking, however, is that supporters make no mention of the
program’s cost.
This article presents a discussion of tax-policy concerns relating to the
charitable deduction for conservation easement donations. The deduction is
unique in a number of ways. First, since 1969, the Internal Revenue Code has
generally denied the deduction for a gift of a partial property interest.5 The
conflict of interest between charity and other owners raises a concern that the
charitable deduction would not reflect the ultimate charitable benefit. The
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1. I.R.C. § 170(f)(3)(B)(iii) (2006); id. § 170(h)(1).
2. Id. § 170(h)(1)(B)–(C). See id. § 170(h)(3) (defining “qualified organization”).
3. See, e.g., Zachary Bray, Reconciling Development and Natural Beauty: The Promise and
Dilemma of Conservation Easements, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 119, 135 (2010); Nancy A.
McLaughlin, Increasing the Tax Incentives for Conservation Easement Donations—A Responsible
Approach, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 22 (2004).
4. Land Trust Alliance President Testifies at Finance Hearing on Land Conservation Tax Breaks,
2005 TAX NOTES TODAY 110-49, June 9, 2005, at 2 (“Since Congress enabled tax deductions for those
donations, land trusts have protected more than 9 million acres of important wildlife habitat, farms,
ranches, and forests with this tool.”). The Land Trust Alliance describes itself as the strategist and
representative of over 1700 land trusts nationwide. Leadership in Land Conservation, LAND TRUST
ALLIANCE, http://www.landtrustalliance.org/about (last visited Dec. 31, 2010).
5. I.R.C. § 170(f)(3)(A).
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deduction for conservation easements is the principal exception to this rule6
despite the significant potential for abuse and the distinct possibility that the
public benefit may be less than anticipated. Moreover, the few other exceptions
are either narrower or more carefully circumscribed.
Second, since 2006, the limitation on the deduction for a qualified
conservation contribution is, at least temporarily,7 uniquely high. In contrast to
the deduction for other appreciated property, which is limited to thirty percent
of the so-called contribution base,8 the deduction limit for a qualified
conservation contribution is generally fifty percent of the contribution base.9 In
the case of certain contributions from persons earning more than fifty percent
of their gross income from farming or ranching, the limit is increased to one
hundred percent.10 Further, instead of the normal carryover of five years for
unused contributions, the carryover for these contributions is extended to
fifteen years.11 In addition, the taxable value of land for estate-tax purposes can
be reduced by as much as $500,000 for up to forty percent of the value of land
subject to a conservation easement, in addition to any value reduction from the
effect of the easement itself.12 These provisions are extraordinary. It is unlikely
many would believe that this charitable purpose should be elevated above all
others.
Although I have previously written on the charitable deduction,13 I am not
an expert on conservation easements. I have been invited to participate in this
symposium, and at earlier conferences at the Lincoln Institute14 and the Harvard

6. See id. § 170(f)(3)(B)(iii) (providing exception for a “qualified conservation contribution”).
7. The liberalization of the deductions limit expired at the end of 2009 pursuant to I.R.C. §
170(b)(1)(E)(vi), but was extended through December 31, 2011 in the Tax Relief, Unemployment
Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 723, 124 Stat. 3296,
3316.
8. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(C).
9. Id. § 170(b)(1)(E)(i). This provision was added as part of the Pension Protection Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-280, §1206(a), 120 Stat. 780, 1068.
10. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(E)(iv).
11. Id. § 170(b)(1)(E)(ii).
12. Id. § 2031(c). Senate Finance Committee Chair Max Baucus introduced legislation, H.R. 4853,
111th Cong. §306 (2010), that would greatly expand this provision to allow estate reduction by as much
as fifty percent of the land value up to $5,000,000. Baucus Amendment Would Extend Tax Cut, 2010
TAX NOTES TODAY 233-82, Dec. 6, 2010, at 37. This provision, however, was not included in the final
version of the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296.
13. See Daniel Halperin, A Charitable Contribution of Appreciated Property and the Realization of
Built-In Gains, 56 TAX L. REV. 1 (2002).
14. Conservation Easements Policy Seminar, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Lincoln House,
Cambridge, Mass. (Feb. 18, 2005). For a brief overview of this conference, see
https://www.lincolninst.edu/education/education-coursedetail.asp?id=254 (last visited Mar. 8, 2011).
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Law School,15 because reporters at the Philadelphia Inquirer16 discovered
testimony I had delivered on behalf of the Treasury back in 1979 and 1980.17 My
testimony had raised serious concerns about allowing the charitable deduction
for conservation easement contributions.
The Treasury was troubled by the possibility of overvaluation of
conservation easements and the difficulty of accurately valuing such partial
interests in land. The Treasury believed that the proposed legislation failed to
provide a sufficiently precise definition of conservation purposes and thus did
not insure that deductible contributions would be confined to those providing
some benefit to the general public. The Treasury was also concerned because
the proposed legislation did not guarantee that the perpetual easements would
be enforced over the long term. The professional tax staffs of the Joint
Committee on Taxation and the Senate Finance Committee expressed similar
reservations in 2005,18 indicating that the problems the Treasury had identified
in 1979 and 1980 remain. To summarize:
1. Unlike gifts of cash or marketable securities, the amount of the deduction for a
conservation easement donation depends upon an appraisal. The uniqueness of each
encumbered property, the variability in easement restrictions, and the paucity of
cash easement sales make it highly unlikely that the value of a conservation
19
easement can be derived from sales of comparable easements.
2. The charitable deduction should be measured by either the loss in value to the donor
or the benefit to charity, whichever is less. The diminution in the donor’s assets
would often suffice. The assumption that the detriment to the donor is equivalent to
the value to charity—which would seem to follow in the case of a cash gift—is not
necessarily true, however, in the case of a conservation easement donation. This
would seem particularly true because the donee is not free to transfer or terminate
the easement, especially if there is no independent certification of the public benefit.
3. When a charity holds only a partial interest in property, there is a significant risk that
the property will be used in a way that is harmful to the charitable interest. This is of
particular concern in the conservation easement context because the scope of the

15. The 8th Annual Conference on Litigating Takings and Other Constitutional Challenges to
Land Use and Environmental Regulations, Georgetown University Law Center CLE/Environmental
Law and Policy Institute, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass. (Oct. 27, 2005). For a brief overview
of this conference, see http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/about_GELPI/Conf05.pdf.
16. Craig R. McCoy & Linda K. Harris, Saving Treasures that Benefit Few; As Federal Law Helps
Protect Private Property, the Public Often Gets Little, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 24, 2002, at A1, available
at http://articles.philly.com/2002-02-24/news/25333700_1_federal-tax-tax-deduction-tax-revenue.
17. Miscellaneous Tax Bills: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the H.
Comm. on Ways & Means, 96th Cong. 11 (1979) (statement of Daniel Halperin, Deputy Assistant
Sec’y, Treasury Dep’t) (in reference to H.R. 4611); Minor Tax Bills: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Select Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 96th Cong. 165 (1980) (statement of
Daniel Halperin, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Treasury Dep’t) (in reference to H.R. 7318).
18. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX
COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES, JCS-2-05, at 277–87 (2005), available at
http://www.jct.gov/s-2-05.pdf; Finance Committee Issues Report on the Nature Conservancy, 2005 TAX
NOTES TODAY 109-11, June 8, 2005.
19. See, e.g., Trout Ranch v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2010-283 (2010) (rejecting taxpayer’s argument
that conservation easement at issue should be valued for purposes of a deduction based on the sale
prices of other conservation easements because such easements were not comparable).
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easement restrictions will often not be easily determinable and because the holder
may have neither the necessary resources for nor the interest in enforcement.

Therefore, the revenue loss from the charitable deductions for easement
donations might well be far more than the public benefit provided. Particularly
at a time of severe revenue constraints, a huge disparity between the tax
benefits (primarily for the wealthiest) and the public benefit is unacceptable.
We need a new approach: one that would require a governmental entity or a
land trust meeting certain minimum standards to certify the public benefit of
the transfer. Given the potential for abuse of the tax deduction, preferably
Congress should substitute direct government grants to facilitate the acquisition
of conservation easements.20 If this approach is not politically viable, it would be
wise to place a dollar limit on the amount of the annual revenue loss by
replacing the deduction with a limited amount of tax credits, to be allocated
among eligible beneficiaries by an expert government agency. At the very least,
such an agency or a beneficiary meeting specified standards should be required
to certify the public charitable benefit.
Although it may appear quite radical, my proposal is actually consistent with
the direction of the tax law. First, this proposal merely recognizes the
conservation easement gift’s unique status as an unlimited exception to the
restrictions on gifts of partial interests, despite circumstances where the abuses
inherent in such gifts are particularly likely to be prevalent. Moreover, the
proposal is consistent with steps that have been taken to restrict deductions for
partial-interest gifts in other contexts and to limit overvaluation of charitable
contributions. Thus, a general modification of the charitable deduction is not a
prerequisite to a new approach to conservation easements.
Second, although once quite rare, dollar limits on the annual cost of tax
expenditures and involvement of other agencies are becoming increasingly
common. In these circumstances, reliance is appropriately placed on an expert
agency to allocate a limited amount of government aid to the acquisition of
conservation easements. In short, given the likely disparity between the revenue
loss from the charitable deduction for conservation easement donations and the
benefit to the public from the easements, change is appropriate.
II
PARTIAL INTERESTS IN PROPERTY
A. In General—1969 Tax Reform Act
The risk that the donor benefit from a charitable deduction will exceed the
public benefit from the donation is greatly increased when the charity receives

20. See Dominic P. Parker, Conservation Easements: A Closer Look at Federal Tax Policy, PERC
POLICY SERIES, Oct. 2005, at 20–22, http://www.perc.org/pdf/ps34.pdf (discussing potential benefits of
replacing federal tax-code funding with “federal competitive grants requiring trusts to raise matching
funds from private sources and local governments”).
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only a partial property interest. A partial interest is unique in that the future
behavior of the donor or a subsequent transferee determines the contributed
property’s charitable value. For example, if I were to give my daughter an
income interest in a trust fund, with a remainder interest to Harvard, I could
have the funds invested in an oil well, which will be dry in ten or fifteen years.
In that case, my daughter’s income would be substantial, but Harvard would
receive nothing. Despite the appearance of a contribution and the receipt of a
deduction, I would have given nothing of value to charity for the public benefit.
This ability to structure partial-interest donations to favor private interests over
the charitable beneficiary led Congress to amend the Internal Revenue Code to
prohibit charitable deductions for most partial-interest gifts.21
That 1969 reform focused on gifts in trust. Reflecting the heightened
concern that prior rules allowed a “taxpayer to receive a charitable contribution
deduction for a gift to charity of a remainder interest in trust which was
substantially in excess of the amount that the charity might eventually
receive,”22 Congress generally limited the deduction to a charitable-remainder
annuity trust or a charitable-remainder unitrust.23 The Joint Committee on
Taxation noted that the limitations “remove the flexibility of the prior
provisions whereby it was possible to favor the income beneficiary over the
remainder beneficiary by means of manipulating the trust’s investments.”24 To
prevent similar abuse, Congress disallowed a deduction for a partial interest not
in trust except in very limited circumstances—an undivided interest in property
and a remainder interest in a personal residence or farm.25
B. Remainder Interest in a Residence
The Senate Finance Committee proposed a deduction for gifts of all
remainder interests in real property, citing as an example a gift of a personal
residence.26 The 1969 Conference Committee subsequently narrowed the Senate
Finance Committee’s proposed rule to allow deductibility only for a remainder
interest in a personal residence or farm.27
Charitable gifts of remainder interests in a personal residence were probably
common types of transfers that, according to the Joint Committee, “Congress
did not believe . . . presented the kind of abuse that it was appropriate to

21. Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201(a)(1), 83 Stat. 487, 556–57 (1969).
22. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 91ST CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969 83 (Comm. Print 1970).
23. I.R.C. § 170(f)(2)(A) (2006).
24. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 91ST CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 84.
25. I.R.C. § 170(f)(3).
26. S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 89 (1969).
27. H.R. REP. NO. 91-782, at 294 (1969) (Conf. Rep.). The special treatment of “farmers” is not
unusual and will not be examined here.
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curtail.”28 Perhaps Congress believed it was unlikely the remainder beneficiaries
would be unduly disadvantaged because there was a negligible risk that a donor
who continued to live in a residence would allow it to deteriorate. Still,
Congress imposed strict standards to forestall overvaluation of remainderinterest gifts.29 This narrow, carefully circumscribed exception to the denial of a
deduction for charitable partial-interest gifts is relevant in examining the need
for further restrictions on deductions for conservation easement transfers.
C. Undivided Interests
In 1969, Congress also allowed a deduction for contributions of an
undivided interest in property, perhaps on the assumption that, because the
charity’s interest was the same as that of other undivided-interest holders, the
value to the charity must be the applicable percentage of the entire value. In
2006, however, Congress realized that the charity would not necessarily receive
what it was entitled to. For example, museums often did not exercise their right
to possess a work of art for the applicable portion of the year, permitting the
donor to retain full possession.30 Therefore, in 2006, Congress substantially
restricted the deduction for an undivided-interest gift, denying the deduction if
the charity did not have substantial physical possession of the property or would
not obtain full ownership within ten years of the initial gift. Further, the fair
market value at the time of the original transfer determines the value of any
subsequent donation unless the value has declined.31 These limitations are
relevant to the consideration of conservation easements, which seem far more
likely to be abused. With an undivided interest in property such as a work of
art, the only question is whether, in deference to the donor, the charity will fail
to enforce its rights. The charity’s rights are clear, and enforcement is
straightforward. With conservation easements, on the other hand, the scope of
the restrictions will often be uncertain, and enforcement is decidedly more
problematic.
D. Conservation Easements
The Internal Revenue Code made no mention of conservation easements in
1969. Although land trusts have existed since the late nineteenth century,32
easements for conservation purposes were rarely seen until the 1930s; and, prior

28. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 91ST CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 84.
29. Id.; see I.R.C. § 170(f)(4) (providing for valuation of remainder interest in real property).
30. See James B. Lyon, Reflections on Deductibility of Contributions of Items of Tangible Personal
Property to Museums, 2007 TAX NOTES TODAY 32-45, Feb. 15, 2007, at 7.
31. I.R.C. § 170(o).
32. For a brief history of land trusts in the United States, beginning with the first land trust, the
Trustees of Public Reservations (formed in Massachusetts in 1891), see RICHARD BREWER,
CONSERVANCY: THE LAND TRUST MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 13–40 (2003). According to Brewer,
although the first national land trust, The Nature Conservancy, was founded in 1946, the land trust
movement did not begin until 1981.
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to the Tax Reform Act of 1969, little was written about them. Thus, it was
perhaps unimportant to the nascent conservation movement that the 1969
reforms appeared to deny a deduction for conservation easements.
Nevertheless, Congress had some last-minute regrets. The 1969 Conference
report described an uncodified exception for certain easements, which were to
be considered the gift of an undivided interest in property.33 This seems strange
because the rationale for the undivided-interest exception—namely that the
charity’s interest was identical to that of the other partial owners—was clearly
inapplicable.
This purported exception may have reflected Congress’s intent to preserve
the charitable deduction the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had recognized for
conservation easements five years earlier.34 In a 1964 Revenue Ruling, the IRS
ruled that a taxpayer who placed a restrictive easement on property adjacent to
a federal highway, limiting the use and development of the land to preserve a
scenic view, was entitled to a charitable income-tax deduction equal to the
easement’s fair market value.35 In 1965, the IRS issued a news release indicating
that charitable deductions could be claimed for gifts of “scenic easements” to
qualified recipients.36 Apparently in reliance on the conference report, the IRS
continued to recognize these exceptions despite the passage of the 1969 Act.37
In the mid-1970s, interest in conservation easements increased. By the
1980s, the use of conservation easements was becoming widespread.38 In these
circumstances, it would have seemed unwise to continue to rely on an
unsupported statement in the legislative history to justify a deduction.
Presumably in response, Congress enacted the Tax Reform Act of 1976,39
temporarily codifying the deductibility of conservation easement donations. No
reason was given for the addition of the easement provisions to the 1976 Act,
and the Act’s legislative history includes no testimony or debate by interested
parties or legislators concerning conservation easement provisions.40 In 1980,
Congress made the conservation easement provisions permanent.41
In sum, Congress has provided a broad, unfettered exception to the rule
disallowing deductions for partial-interest gifts for conservation easement
donations; but, as the Treasury testimony noted, it has failed to pay sufficient
attention to whether there is protection from the serious problems that led to
33. H.R. REP. NO. 91-782, at 292 (1969) (“The conferences on the part of both Houses intend that
a gift of an open space easement in gross is to be considered a gift of an undivided interest in property
where the easement is in perpetuity.”).
34. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 64-205, 1964-2 C.B. 62.
35. Id.
36. I.R.S. News Release IR-65-784 (Nov. 15, 1965).
37. See S. REP. NO. 96-1007, at 8–9 (1980).
38. BREWER, supra note 32, at 148.
39. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2124(e), 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
40. Stephen J. Small, An Obscure Tax Provision, in PROTECTING THE LAND: CONSERVATION
EASEMENTS PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 55, 56–57 (Julie Ann Gustanski & Roderick H. Squires
eds., 2000).
41. Pub. L. No. 96-541, § 6, 94 Stat. 3204 (1980).
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these deductions’ prohibition. This failure is highlighted by the recent severe
restrictions on gifts of undivided interests. There are substantial questions
whether the charitable deduction for conservation easements reflects the
charity’s benefit from the gift,42 in part because the definition of public benefit is
imprecise and because there rarely is direct evidence of the value to the public.
Further, it is not clear that the intended conservation benefit, such as it is, will
be secured. Restrictions on the use of the property in an easement can be
murky and difficult to interpret. Even if they are not, the current regulations
provide inadequate assurance that holders will enforce the perpetual
conservation easements according to their terms.
E. Enforcement
“The real work with conservation easements begins after the signature ink is
dry. Even the best written easements are only as good as the holder’s resolve
and capacity over the long term to monitor, enforce, and defend them.”43
Unfortunately, the current Treasury regulations do not provide adequate
assurance that easements will be enforced. The Treasury regulations do require
the organization receiving a conservation easement to be a publicly supported
charity that has “a commitment to protect the conservation purposes of the
donation, and . . . the resources to enforce the restrictions.”44 But this can be a
mirage. The commitment can be shown merely by including the appropriate
language in the organization’s articles of incorporation, and the organization
“need not set aside funds to enforce the restrictions.”45 The regulations also fail
to specify what an organization must do following the gift to demonstrate that it
has the requisite commitment and resources.
Recognizing this problem, in 2005, the Senate Finance Committee staff
recommended that the IRS issue guidance establishing the conditions necessary
for compliance with the monitoring obligation, which might include a
stewardship fund, periodic monitoring reports, and a centralized directory of
easements.46 As suggested, the annual information return filed with the IRS now
requires the organization to state whether it has a written policy regarding the
periodic monitoring, inspection, handling of violations, and enforcement of
easements, and asks for data as to the time and money devoted to this purpose.47
But the IRS has not indicated what enforcement activity is required.48

42. See infra Part III.
43. JEFF PIDOT, REINVENTING CONSERVATION EASEMENTS, A CRITICAL EXAMINATION AND
IDEAS FOR REFORM 18 (Lincoln Inst. of Land Policy 2005).
44. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c)(1) (as amended in 2009).
45. Id.
46. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 109TH CONG., 1 REP. OF STAFF INVESTIGATION OF THE
NATURE CONSERVANCY, at Executive Summary 11 (Comm. Print 2005).
47. Schedule D to Form 990, the Annual Return of an Organization Exempt From Income Tax.
Schedule D is required for all easement holders, which must disclose this status in Question 7 of Form
990, Part IV. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 109TH CONG., 1 REP. OF STAFF INVESTIGATION OF
THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, at Executive Summary 11 (recommending that the IRS modify Form
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Of course, the failure to enforce the easement would in most cases have no
impact on the donor’s deduction. Thus, to strengthen the obligation to enforce,
the Senate Finance Committee staff also recommended in 2005 that “the IRS
consider revoking the tax exempt status of a conservation organization that
regularly and continuously fails to monitor and enforce conservation
easements.”49 Most significantly, the staff recommended that “the law should
permit the IRS to impose excise taxes on officers and directors for failure to
adopt and enforce policies to assure the organization satisfies its monitoring and
enforcement obligations.”50 This is a sensible idea that would put real teeth in
the enforcement obligation. It deserves to be considered by Congress.
In any event, it is not enough that the holder care about protecting the
easement; it must have the resources to do so. “Many land trusts are newly
created, underfunded, and in a weak position to commit to this kind of
permanent stewardship.”51 Therefore, the donee should be required to certify
that it has selected the easement consistent with its mission and that it has both
the resources to manage and enforce the restriction and a commitment to do so.
Further, as the Senate staff suggested, funds should be set aside for monitoring,
defending, and enforcing the easement. The Land Trust Alliance has taken
substantial steps to achieve this goal as part of its accreditation process.52
Ideally, the Internal Revenue Code should require that tax-deductible
easements be held solely by organizations that meet rigorous uniform
standards.53 Moreover, because it is obviously easier to set aside adequate funds
if one expects a problem with a relatively small percentage of a large number of
easements, eligibility should be restricted to organizations that hold a
substantial number of easement grants and have sufficient staff to monitor and
enforce compliance. To assure that funds will be available for enforcement, the
donor should be required either to contribute such funds or to demonstrate that
the organization has adequate resources. These steps would increase the
990 “to require conservation organizations to provide information regarding its ongoing monitoring
and enforcement policies and practices”).
48. But see generally I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201048045 (Dec. 3, 2010) (denying tax-exempt status for
failure to demonstrate ability to enforce easement); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201109030 (Mar. 4, 2011)
(denying exempt status for accepting nonqualifying property and for failure to monitor and enforce
easements); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201110020 (Mar. 11, 2011) (denying exempt status inter alia for failure
to ensure that accepted easements serve a conservation purpose or to demonstrate its commitment to
protect the easements it accepts).
49. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 109TH CONG., 1 REP. OF STAFF INVESTIGATION OF THE
NATURE CONSERVANCY, at Executive Summary 10.
50. Id.
51. PIDOT, supra note 43.
52. See Land Trust Standards and Practices, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, 8–9, 12 (2004) (Standard 8:
Evaluating and Selecting Conservation Projects; and Standard 11: Conservation and Easement
Stewardship), http://www.landtrustalliance.org/training/sp/lt-standards-practices07.pdf. These standards
must be adopted as part of the Alliance’s accreditation process. See also Accreditation Requirements,
LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, http://www.landtrustaccreditation.org/getting-accredited/are-you-ready (last
visited Mar. 31, 2011).
53. PIDOT, supra note 43, at 21.
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likelihood that the public benefit from an easement donation will be in accord
with the terms of the gift.
III
DETERMINING THE BENEFIT TO CHARITY
A. Valuation In General
Even if the gift is enforced according to its terms, however, it is not
necessarily the case that the public benefit flowing from an easement donation
will match the tax revenue lost from the deduction. If the public benefit is not
commensurate with the revenue loss, one of the traditional rationales for
allowing tax deductions for charitable donations—namely that charitable
activities serve as a substitute for government services—will not be satisfied.54
When a contributor donates cash, the amount contributed (which ordinarily
determines the tax deduction) would, apart from the costs of fundraising,55 be
identical to the benefit to charity. Gifts of property raise greater concern for
two reasons. First, unlike cash, the value of property may be misstated. It can be
difficult to determine the value of a donated item,56 and there is a strong
incentive for a donor to overstate the value of her donation in order to claim a
larger deduction and thus decrease her taxable income. Second, the value of the
property in the charity’s hands may be less than its fair market value. Both
concerns arise in the context of conservation easement donations, and it is
instructive that Congress has attempted to address these concerns with respect
to other forms of charitable contributions.
For example, in the case of tangible personal property, which can be difficult
to value, section 170(e) of the Internal Revenue Code mitigates the valuation

54. Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 606 n.292 (1990);
Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity Tax Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L.
585, 590 (1998) (“Under the subsidy theory, tax exemption functions as an inducement to charities to
undertake specific activities or to engage in behavior a certain way. For example, under the classic
conception of this ‘quid-pro-quo’ approach, the state bestows tax exemption in recognition of charities’
lessening the burdens of government.”); id. at 590 n.23 (discussing legislative history supporting this
rationale); see C. Eugene Steuerle & Martin A. Sullivan, Toward More Simple and Effective Giving:
Reforming the Tax Rules for Charitable Contributions and Charitable Organizations, 12 AM. J. TAX
POL’Y 399, 404 (1995) (stating that among other justifications for the charitable deduction “is the belief
that the philanthropic sector represents a third sector that sometimes can meet needs better or more
efficiently than the government or the individual acting on his or her own behalf”).
55. Excessive fundraising costs call into question the efficiency of charitable organizations. The
discussion in the text might suggest we should seek a mechanism to exclude from donors’ tax
deductions the portion of each donation attributable to fundraising costs. This is an issue affecting all
charitable organizations and will not be pursued here.
56. William A. Drennan, Charitable Donations of Intellectual Property: The Case for Retaining the
Fair Market Value Tax Deduction, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1045, 1084 n.173 (2004); see Erin Thompson,
The Relationship Between Tax Deductions and the Market for Unprovenanced Antiquities, 33 COLUM.
J.L. & ARTS 241, 243–45 (2010) (discussing the difficulty of assessing the fair market value of art and
the IRS’s appraisal verification procedures). Thompson notes that, in 2007, the IRS Art Advisory Panel
accepted only thirty-six percent of the appraisals it reviewed without changes. Id. at 245.
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problem by limiting the charitable deduction to basis, usually cost, unless the
receiving charity uses the property in a manner consistent with its exempt
charitable purpose.57 When it applies, this provision eliminates the valuation
issue. It also deters such gifts, thereby reducing the misalignment between the
deduction and the value to charity that occurs when a deduction fails to account
for the costs the charity incurs in disposing of the property. But this provision
does not apply to gifts of real property like conservation easements and, in any
event, would not apply when the receiving charity uses the property in a
manner consistent with its exempt charitable purpose.
Moreover, limiting the deduction to cost, though important in preventing
overvaluation, would not prevent the deduction from exceeding the property
value if value is below the original cost. The latter would generally be true when
the property, such as a household or clothing item, was originally purchased for
personal use. In such cases, there are additional restrictions that focus on the
value to the charity. To ensure there is some value to the charity from the
donation of a household or clothing item, a taxpayer may not claim a deduction
for such item that is not in “good used condition or better,” unless the item is
worth more than $500 and the taxpayer provides a qualified appraisal to that
effect.58
Among donations of tangible personal property, used automobile
contributions, in particular, have raised questions about the proportionality of
charitable tax deductions. The IRS previously allowed donors to deduct the socalled blue-book value of a car even though donors would not likely be able to
sell the car for that amount unless they advertised heavily and sold the car in a
private transaction.59 Concerns about taxpayers’ inflating the value of donated
used cars60 led Congress to amend the Internal Revenue Code in 2004 to
generally limit deductions of used-car donations above $500 to the gross
proceeds of the charity’s subsequent sale.61 Charities, however, often partner
with for-profit entities that act as the charity’s agent. The agent will bear the
cost of taking possession and selling the vehicle and, perhaps, for advertising
the program. These costs plus the agent’s fee are subtracted from the amount
paid to the charity, which suggests the charity could receive considerably less

57. I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B)(i) (2006).
58. Id. § 170(f)(16).
59. Rev. Rul. 2002-67, 2002-2 C.B. 813.
60. See Wendy C. Gerzog, From the Greedy to the Needy, 87 OR. L. REV. 1133, 1145 (2008) (“The
strict rules regarding the donation of vehicles are a response to the excessive and dubious deductions
that donors were taking, echoing the aggressive advertising of the donee charities. . . . The benefit[] to
the donor in terms of a tax deduction sometimes exceeds any benefit to the charity.”); U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-73, VEHICLE DONATIONS: BENEFITS TO CHARITIES AND
DONORS, BUT LIMITED PROGRAM OVERSIGHT (2003), available at www.gao.gov/htext/d0473.html
(finding that in a majority of cases examined, charities received five percent or less of deduction
claimed).
61. I.R.C. § 170(f)(12); I.R.S. Notice 2005-44, 2005-1 C.B. 1287.
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than the selling price.62 Thus, although the 2004 legislation ameliorates some
valuation problems by linking deductions to the sale price of donated
automobiles,63 it does not entirely ensure that each deduction’s revenue cost
matches the benefit to the recipient charity.
Despite its limitations, the decision to focus on the charitable value in the
case of used automobile donations (as opposed to the asserted “loss” to the
donor based upon the price that some hypothetical buyer might be willing to
pay for the car) is important. In 2004, Congress similarly based the tax
deduction for gifts of copyrights, patents, and other intellectual property largely
on the amount of the income actually received by the donee.64 These changes
illustrate the inappropriateness of focusing primarily on the decline in the value
of the donor’s property or assets. The cost to the government, namely the
revenue loss from the charitable deduction, should never exceed the actual
benefit to charity.
B. Valuing Easement Donations
Congress’s concern with overvaluation of charitable contributions and its
focus on the value to the recipient show that modification of the rules
applicable to conservation easement donations is appropriate. The rules for
conservation easement gifts provide inadequate assurance that the amount of
the charitable deduction will be properly determined. Easements are often hard
to appraise and easy to overvalue. For a conservation easement, for which
comparable sales (purchases of similar easements on closely similar properties)
would be rare, the focus is on the decline in the property value for the donor
due to the imposition of the restriction. But not only is this decline difficult to
measure, the approach itself is also faulty. As a consequence, the donor is often
able to take a higher federal tax deduction than is justifiable.
The IRS regulations provide that, in the absence of comparable sales, a
donor must generally look to the difference between the value of the property
before the restriction and the value of the property subject to the easement.65
This is extremely difficult to determine because it is heavily fact specific. For
example, it would be necessary to determine what the zoning regulations are,
whether they are likely to change, and what sort of development was
commercially feasible prior to the restrictions, as well as other issues. That there
is no standard form of easement exacerbates these difficulties, as does the IRS’s
62. See generally GAO Report, supra note 60; Rev. Rul. 2002-67, 2002-2 C.B. 873; I.R.S. Pub.
4302, A Charity’s Guide to Car Donations (2004), reprinted in 2010 TAX NOTES TODAY 92-27, May 13,
2010.
63. See Richard J. Kovach, New Rulemaking Approaches to Improve Federal Tax Administration
Through Use of Precisional Substitutions that Avoid Valuation Uncertainties, 6 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J.
79, 83 (2005) (arguing that tax code’s limit on vehicle donations be expanded to additional asset
categories).
64. I.R.C. § 170(m). See id. § 170(e)(1)(B)(iii) (allowing deduction for donor’s basis without regard
to donee’s income); H.R. REP. NO. 108-548, pt. 1, at 352–53 (2004).
65. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i) (as amended in 2009).
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lack of the resources required to wade through long documents—drafted by
hundreds of different attorneys—in order to determine exactly what restrictions
are in place and whether the easements satisfy the various requirements under
section 170(h) and the Treasury Regulations. The use of standardized language
as a condition for a tax deduction has thus been recommended.66 This should be
seriously considered.
Another problem with conservation easement donations is that the donor
may actually benefit from use restrictions. The regulations recognize that an
easement restricting neighboring development could increase the value of
nearby properties. Thus, the donor must take into account the effect the
easement may have on the value of other property owned by the donor or a
related party and reduce the charitable deduction accordingly.67 Because
reciprocal easements by owners of adjoining property could increase the value
of the whole area, however, the donor should also be required to account for
any increase in value of other property, owned by the donor or a related party,
due to corresponding restrictions placed by owners of nearby properties. This
may prove impossible, making the donor’s loss even more difficult to quantify.
More importantly, this is the wrong question. As the restrictions on gifts of
intellectual property and used automobiles demonstrate, the diminution in
value to the donor is an inappropriate starting point in measuring the benefit to
the public. The focus should be on actual benefit to the public, and the taxpayer
should be required to present evidence as to this amount. Otherwise, there is no
assurance that the charitable benefit will match the revenue loss.
The decline in value to the holder, however, should be the maximum
deduction. When it is clear that there will be no impact on the donor’s
enjoyment of the property in the foreseeable future, a deduction is
inappropriate. Therefore, it is disturbing that, in a number of recent cases, the
Tax Court has rejected the IRS’s zero or negligible easement valuation, which
the IRS apparently based on the idea that the value to the donor had not
changed. The court reasoned that a prospective purchaser would surely take the
restrictions into account. In at least one case, the court specifically noted that
the government expert had confused “the post-easement value of the land to
[the donor] with the fair market value of the land to a willing buyer and
seller.”68 To the contrary, the post-gift value to the donor is highly relevant. If
66. PIDOT, supra note 43, at 9–10; Nancy A. McLaughlin & W. William Weeks, In Defense of
Conservation Easements: A Response to the End of Perpetuity, 9 WYO. L. REV. 1, 84 n.319 (2009) (“As
in the charitable remainder and charitable lead trust context, to facilitate compliance, enforcement, and
consistency in interpretation, the Treasury Department should develop sample conservation easement
provisions that satisfy the requirements of the Internal Revenue Code § 170(h) and the Treasury
Regulations interpreting that section. Such provisions could address, for example, the circumstances
under which a tax-deductible conservation easement can be amended, transferred, or extinguished; the
calculation and division of proceeds upon extinguishment; and the holder’s use of its share of the
proceeds upon extinguishment.”).
67. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i).
68. Akers v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1984-490 (1984), aff’d, 799 F.2d 243 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoted in
Scott D. McClure, Steven E. Hollingsworth & Nicole D. Brown, Courts to the IRS: Ease Up on
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the donor has given nothing away, the tax deduction is merely a windfall, not an
incentive to contribute. The post-gift value to the donor is especially relevant in
the absence of any evidence of the value that would be attributed to the
easement by a responsible land trust.
C. Establishing Public Benefit
Although the current Internal Revenue Code does require a conservation
purpose,69 the definition is too open ended. The standard for determining public
benefit is vague, especially when there is no public access and the property has
no value as a habitat for plants and animals. The preservation of open space for
scenic enjoyment is particularly problematic. The regulations state that “to
satisfy the requirement of scenic enjoyment by the general public, visual (rather
than physical access) to or across the property by the general public is
sufficient,”70 which indicates that the donor might not have given up anything of
value. Furthermore, that “the entire property need not be visible to the public”71
leaves open the question of how much the public must be able to see. The
regulations provide that “the public benefit from the donation may be
insufficient to qualify for a deduction if only a small portion of the property is
visible to the public.”72 This language suggests to a tax lawyer that it may be
enough to claim a deduction if the public can see only a small portion and that it
is certainly sufficient if the public can see a portion that is only slightly bigger
than “small.”
Discussing the vagueness of what is meant by scenic enjoyment illustrates
the general problem with the public-benefit standard. In response, in 2005, the
staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (which serves both the House Ways
and Means Committee and the Senate Committee on Finance) recommended
that, to qualify for a deduction, a contribution must generally protect or
preserve property pursuant to a clearly defined governmental conservation
policy, which is now required only in the case of some donations in order to
protect open space.73 A clearly defined governmental conservation policy is the
minimum requirement necessary to assure some public benefit. Under the
current regulations, however, the government need not identify particular
parcels, and the governmental policy could be quite vague.74
Ideally, the donee should be required to certify publicly that it views the
public benefit to be at the level of the claimed deduction, which should also be
publicly disclosed. Charitable organizations generally do not wish to take
Conservation Easement Valuations, 124 TAX NOTES 551, 552–53, Aug. 10, 2009 (discussing a number of
cases in which the IRS proposed a zero or negligible value for the easement)).
69. I.R.C. § 170(h)(4)(A).
70. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(ii)(B).
71. Id.
72. Id. (emphasis added).
73. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX
COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES, JCS-2-05, at 286 (2005).
74. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(iii)(A).
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responsibility for abusive deductions, viewing this as a matter to be worked out
between the donor and the IRS. Nevertheless, more involvement by the charity
is essential if we are to continue a special exemption from the rule prohibiting a
deduction for a partial interest in property without other protection against the
potential abuse that led to that prohibition. The Land Trust Alliance’s
Standards and Practices requires the recipient to evaluate the public benefit and
to review each transaction for consistency with tax requirements. Yet, although
the trust must agree that it “will not knowingly participate in projects where it
has significant concerns about the tax deduction,” the standards indicate that
the donor is responsible for determining the value of the donation.75 The
recipient should instead be required to share the responsibility for valuation.
D. Viability of Current Approach
The prior discussion demonstrates that the concerns the Treasury expressed
more than thirty years ago—namely, potential lack of enforcement, inadequacy
of public benefit, and overvaluation of contributions—remain. Donors may be
giving up very little, particularly because the burden on a donor depends upon
the holder’s monitoring and enforcing the use restrictions over the long term. In
addition, an easement’s benefit to the public may be much less than the
purported loss to the donor.
Publicity generated by articles in the Washington Post76 led to heightened
IRS enforcement efforts,77 including enhanced information-reporting
requirements,78 and fairly drastic proposals for legislative change from the
congressional staff. Even the land-trust community acknowledged that some
action was needed.
It is not surprising that the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation
recommended that deductions be disallowed entirely for easements connected
to the taxpayer’s residence and limited to thirty-three percent of their value in
all other circumstances.79 The staff reasoned that, in the case of residences, the
deduction often resulted in a windfall because the owners frequently
anticipated no restriction on planned use.80 Thus, in light of what the staff
viewed as insurmountable valuation difficulties, it was best to eliminate the
75. Land Trust Standards and Practices, supra note 52, at 12 (Standard 10: Tax Benefits); see also
id. at 8–9 (Standard 8: Evaluating and Selecting Conservation Projects).
76. See, e.g., Joe Stephens & David B. Ottaway, Nonprofit Sells Scenic Acreage to Allies at a Loss:
Buyers Gain Tax Breaks with Few Curbs on Land Use, WASH. POST, May 6, 2003, at A1.
77. Fred Stokeld, IRS Focusing on Deductions for Donated Easements, Miller Says, 49 EXEMPT
ORG. TAX REV. 197, 197 (Aug. 2005); Everson Testifies Before Senate Finance Regarding EOs, 2005
TAX NOTES TODAY 65-46, Apr. 6, 2005, at 8–9 (testimony of Mark W. Everson, Comm’r of Internal
Revenue); I.R.S. Notice 2004-41, 2004-2 C.B. 31; Janet Novack, Feds Sue Trust Over Historic Easement
Tax Breaks, TAXING MATTERS, FORBES BLOG (June 16, 2011, 1:52 PM), http://blogs.forbes.com/janet
novack/2011/06/16/feds-sue-trust-over-historic-easement-tax-breaks/.
78. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
79. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX
COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES, JCS-2-05, at 286 (2005).
80. Id. at 284.
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deduction entirely. In other cases, they viewed the problem as less severe, but
still found valuation concerns significant enough to warrant limiting the
deduction to thirty-three percent of the appraised amount. The staff clearly
came to the same conclusion that Congress reached in 1969 with respect to gifts
of partial interests—under present circumstances, the risk of tax abuse
outweighs the potential benefits. Therefore, it would be best to substantially
curtail the program.
Predictably, Congress did not do as the staff suggested. The land-trust
community strongly opposed the proposals, which would have drastically
reduced the availability of a tax deduction. Although the community agreed
that it would be sensible to prohibit deductions in some extreme cases, such as
easements on golf courses or backyards, their focus was on increased IRS
enforcement and securing more-accurate valuations—for example, by
establishing standards for appraisers and increasing the penalty for abuse.81
The Pension Protection Act of 200682 attempted to make appraisals more
accurate by increasing the penalty for valuation misstatements and imposing
additional penalties on appraisers,83 who must also meet certain standards to be
“qualified” as appraisers.84 Yet, despite suggestions from the congressional staff
that the deduction be restricted, the Act went in the other direction,
temporarily increasing the limit on conservation easement contributions from
thirty percent to fifty percent and allowing an unlimited deduction for
contributions by “qualified” farmers and ranchers.85
In my view, the restrictions adopted in 2006 are insufficient and do not come
close to dealing with the problem. More disclosure of conservation easements
on the annual return, which the IRS is requiring, will help but will not suffice.
Although the IRS has significantly increased its attention to this area, it can
obviously audit only a small sample of all transactions. Even putting aside
deliberate abuse, the appraisal process is so indeterminate that getting the
valuation right is extraordinarily difficult.
In fact, more enforcement is the usual taxpayer response to the problem of
identifying abuse. But, of course, the IRS does not get an increased budget for
the task, and, in fact, no one wants an army of auditors. Not surprisingly,
stepped-up enforcement efforts have led to criticism from tax lawyers.86
Moreover, more enforcement here means less enforcement elsewhere.

81. See Land Trust Alliance President Testifies, supra note 4, at 4–7.
82. Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1219(b), 120 Stat. 780.
83. I.R.C. § 6695A (2006).
84. Id. § 170(f)(11)(E).
85. Id. § 170(b)(1)(E)(i), (iv).
86. E.g., Internal Revenue Service Advisory Council 2009 General Report, IRS (2010), available at
http://www.irs.gov/taxpros/article/0,,id=215543,00.html (urging moderation of IRS audits with respect to
historic preservation easements); IRS Official Defends Audit Strategy on Conservation Easements, 2009
TAX NOTES TODAY 185-7, Sept. 28, 2009; Scott D. McClure, Steven E. Hollingsworth & Nicole D.
Brown, Courts to IRS: Ease Up on Conservation Easement Valuations, 124 TAX NOTES 551, Aug. 10,
2009.
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Parts II and III of this paper include proposals that would help to align the
charitable deduction with the public benefit. Nevertheless, a new approach is
preferable.
IV
A NEW APPROACH—DIRECT EXPENDITURES
The current scheme for encouraging landowners to donate conservation
easements is implemented through the income-tax system. The same
conservation goals could also be addressed, however, through a direct
government-spending program. A third option is to design a program in which a
substantive agency, such as the Bureau of Land Management, helps to
administer the tax incentives, with an annual dollar cap. A fourth option is to
place a dollar limit on the annual expenditures for conservation easements,
even if the IRS continues to administer the program. At the very least, an
expert agency should be required to attest to the easement’s public value. These
different approaches offer various benefits and drawbacks.
A. The Superiority of Direct Expenditures
David Weisbach and Jacob Nussim have proposed a framework for deciding
whether a tax-expenditure program or a direct-spending program would be
more appropriate for a given policy goal.87 They argue that the key is to
determine how accurately a particular agency can implement a policy goal for a
given cost.88 Applying this framework in the context of conservation easements,
we would compare the efficiency of a tax-expenditure program with that of a
direct-spending program. The question then becomes: what value of land could
be conserved for a given amount of either tax revenue forgone or government
funds expended?
Promoting conservation easement donation through a tax-expenditure
program has certain benefits. First, it takes advantage of the tax system’s
existing infrastructure. Individuals who donate conservation easements are
already filing a tax return, and tax benefits can be distributed to the donor with
minimal additional costs. The donor bears the cost of appraising the value of
the easement, thus limiting the administrative burden on the IRS, at least
initially.89 The program is open ended, eliminating the need to prioritize or
compare the merit of individual donations. In comparison to a direct-spending

87. See generally David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending
Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955 (2004).
88. Id. at 993 (“A more accurate policy better distinguishes between different individuals or
different actions. It comes closer to the optimum.”).
89. The IRS monitors valuation after the fact through audits. Historically, the IRS has been much
more likely to audit donors based on their estimate of the easement valuation than on any other
measure of substantive compliance with § 170(h). It should be noted, however, that audits based on
other requirements have appeared to increase in recent years. See C. TIMOTHY LINDSTROM, A TAX
GUIDE TO CONSERVATION EASEMENTS 11 (2008).
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program, which would need to evaluate and rank applications in order to
allocate limited funds, it seems likely that integrating the program with the tax
system would minimize administrative costs.
Of course, this comes at the cost of greater accuracy. An open-ended taxbenefit program is likely to have broad, rather than targeted, eligibility
requirements. Further, because the IRS lacks the institutionalized knowledge of
a more specialized agency, such as the Bureau of Land Management, it will be
less capable of enforcing even these broader parameters consistently and
coherently. Consequently, a tax expenditure will distribute more dollars than is
likely to be appropriated, in exchange for less benefit.
Implementing a program through the tax system would provide a particular
benefit when doing so will take advantage of already existing definitions,
measurements, and infrastructure.90 The IRS’s primary institutional advantage is
income measurement, which makes it a good fit for programs that have incomebased eligibility requirements.91 The primary measurements at issue in the
conservation easement program, though, are satisfaction of the conservationpurposes tests and value of the easement. The Bureau of Land Management,
with its specialized knowledge of the field, would seem to be much better
equipped than the IRS to measure both. A specialized agency would also be
better suited to assess other eligibility requirements, such as whether an
easement’s conservation purpose is “protected in perpetuity.”92
Substantive agency review of applications, therefore, would likely lead to
greater consistency in implementation and could help to curb valuation abuse.
Also, in contrast to an open-ended tax-deduction program, a direct-spending
program could be targeted in various ways. For example, a program that
evaluates and ranks individual applications could give preference to easements
with the greatest conservation value. The program could also be adapted to
meet specific conservation goals or to allocate funds in a way that balances the
benefit across geographic areas. A direct-spending program could also be more
easily targeted to a specific type of land or a specific class of landowners.
For example, prior to the 2006 amendments to the conservation easement
deduction, much discussion arose concerning a group of “land-rich, cash-poor”
landowners who lacked a sufficient incentive to donate under the program in
effect at the time.93 The 2006 amendments, which allowed an unlimited
deduction for contributions made by “qualified” farmers and ranchers and
substantially increased deductions for other donors, appear to have been
designed to reach this group.94 But a deduction will always be an inadequate
incentive for individuals who have little or no taxable income. If conserving
farm or ranch land is a particularly important goal, it could be accomplished in a
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 87, at 1008.
See id. at 1001 (discussing the Earned Income Tax Credit).
I.R.C. § 170(h)(2)(C) (2006).
See, e.g., McLaughlin, supra note 3, at 6 n.14.
See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(E)(iv).
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more straightforward manner through a grant program than by varying
deduction limitations across multiple subsections of the Internal Revenue Code.
Any government purchase of a conservation easement involves a direct
expenditure and affects some agency’s budget. The amount spent is known and
relevant, projects can be prioritized based on merit, and the program can be
targeted to accomplish specific conservation goals. On the other hand, Congress
often acts as if tax benefits are a free lunch and have no effect on the deficit.
Moreover, tax provisions can be more easily abused.95 Because the advantages
of the tax-expenditure approach are minimal in the case of conservation
easement donations, the inefficiency of this approach should be recognized and
direct grants used instead.
B. Limited Tax Credits Allocated by an Expert Agency
If the tax preference remains, Congress should impose additional conditions
to approximate the direct-expenditure approach as nearly as possible. This
requires some direct involvement by a public agency.
Thus, an additional option would be to design a program that is jointly
implemented by the IRS and an expert agency. For example, the deduction for
conservation easement contributions could be eliminated and replaced by tax
credits, capped at a certain dollar amount each year. These tax credits could be
allocated by application to the Bureau of Land Management. One longstanding example of this type of program, which has recently become far more
common, is the Low Income Housing Tax Credit, through which state housing
agencies distribute a fixed allotment of tax credits to developers of affordable
housing projects.96
Two recent, additional examples of such tax-credit programs have
authorized up to $250 million in tax credits for certain gasification projects 97 and
up to $1.25 billion in tax credits for coal facilities.98 Both amounts are allocated
through a joint application to the IRS and the Department of Energy.99 The
Department of Energy also participates in the implementation of the Qualified

95. See Stephen J. Small, Proper-and-Improper Deductions for Conservation Easements, Including
Developer Donations, 105 TAX NOTES 217-224, Oct. 11, 2004.
96. I.R.C. § 42(h). This program was created under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99514, § 252, 100 Stat. 2085. Annual tax expenditures for fiscal year 2010 are estimated to be $4.7 billion
for corporations and $300 million for individuals. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH
CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2009-2013, JCS-1-10, at 33
(Comm. Print 2010). Under the program, state agencies have wide discretion in setting criteria by which
they will award credits to proposed projects.
97. I.R.S. Notice 2009-23, 2009-16 I.R.B. 802. Tax credits for the “qualifying gasification project
program” under I.R.C. § 48B were authorized by section 112 of the Energy Improvement and
Extension Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765.
98. I.R.S. Notice 2009-24, 2009-16 I.R.B. 817. Tax credits for the qualifying advanced-coal-project
program under I.R.C. § 48A were authorized by section 111 of the Energy Improvement and Extension
Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765.
99. Edward Kleinbard describes both of these examples in The Congress Within a Congress: How
Tax Expenditures Distort Our Budget and Our Political Process, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010).
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Advanced Energy Project Credit100 and the Credit for Production From
Advanced Nuclear Power Facilities.101 This approach may be more politically
palatable than an explicit direct-spending program and would be an
improvement on the current regime.
A program through which the Bureau of Land Management allocates a
capped level of tax benefits to conservation easement donors would have many
of the benefits listed above for direct-spending programs—including harnessing
agency expertise, increasing consistency in implementation, and allowing for
more-targeted distribution. A closed-ended program would also force greater
prioritization of government funds for conservation easements.
As in the Low Income Housing Tax Credit example, the tax benefits could
potentially be allocated to state land-use agencies to distribute, allowing for
diverse priorities across regions. In other programs, state agencies allocate the
tax credits available on the issuance of certain bonds bearing tax credits.102 A
program could also be designed that would distribute tax credits directly to land
trusts, which could then use the credits to “buy” conservation easements
directly from landowners. This proposal is analogous to the New Markets Tax
Credit, through which the Treasury allocates a capped level of tax credits to
designated Community Development Entities (CDEs). The CDEs are then able
to allocate these credits to investors whose funds were used to invest in lowincome communities.103
Such caps on tax expenditures are becoming more common, even if no
outside agency is involved, particularly in programs for the issuance of bonds
entitling the holder to tax credits.104 Congress has also placed limits on the tax
incentives for the purchase of alternative-fuel cars.105 Thus, consistent with
emerging practice, Congress should place a dollar limit on the conservation

100. I.R.C. § 48C (allocated by Treasury in consultation with Department of Energy based on
criteria described in § 48C(d)).
101. Id. § 45J. The Treasury allocates the annual limit after consultation with the Secretary of
Energy under “necessary and appropriate” regulations. Id. § 45J(b)(4).
102. Qualified Energy Conservation Bonds, id. § 54D (allocated by Treasury to states and large
local governments by population, id. § 54D(e)); Qualified Zone Academy Bonds, id. § 54E (allocated
by Treasury to states in proportion to population below poverty line, id. § 54E(c)); Qualified School
Construction Bonds, id. § 54F (allocated by Treasury to states and large school districts in proportion to
eligibility to receive certain grants under Elementary and Secondary Education Act, id. § 54F(d)).
103. Id. § 45D(f)(2). Congress capped the total level of tax credits at $5 billion for 2009. Id. §
45D(f)(1)(F) (West 2009).
104. Tax Credit to Holders of Clean Renewable Energy Bonds, id. § 54 (bond limitation allocated
by Treasury, id. § 54(f)); New Clean Renewable Energy Bonds, id. § 54C (allocated by Treasury
according to formula specified in Code, id. § 54C(c)(3)); Qualified Forestry Conservation Bonds, id. §
54B (allocated by Treasury as it deems appropriate based upon applications submitted, id. § 54B(d));
Qualified Gulf Opportunity Zone Bond, id. § 1400N(a)(2)–(3) (maximum based on dollar amount per
relevant population); Recovery Zone Bonds, id. §§ 1400U-2, 1400U-3 (allocated by Treasury in
proportion to 2008 employment decline, id. § 1400U-1(a)).
105. Alternative Motor Vehicle Credit, id. § 30B (phased out after first 60,000 cars, id. § 30B(f));
New Qualified Plug-in Electric Drive Motor Vehicles, id. § 30D (phased out after first 200,000 vehicles,
id. § 30D(e)).
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easement program even if it is administered through tax credits whether or not
another agency is involved.
C. Certification of Public Benefit
At the very least, a governmental agency should attest to the value of the
conservation purpose. A long-standing example of agency involvement, which is
now becoming more frequent, is the Department of Interior’s certification
procedure for tax credits for the rehabilitation of historic structures. No credit is
allowed for any expenditure attributable to the rehabilitation of a certified
historic structure or a building in a registered historic district unless the
Secretary of Interior certifies that rehabilitation is “consistent with the historic
character of such property or the district in which such property is located.”106
Further, the Work Opportunity Credit, which provides tax credits to employers
who hire certain classes of difficult-to-employ individuals, restricts eligibility to
individuals certified by a designated local agency.107 Other programs require the
participation of another agency in implementing a tax credit.108 Similarly,
eligibility for a charitable deduction for a conservation easement should be
contingent on certification—by a public agency or, possibly, an IRS-accredited
land trust109—that the public benefit from the contribution is equivalent to the
claimed deduction.
V
CONCLUSION
In sum, the recent changes to various tax-expenditure programs—placing
caps on the expenditures and requiring the participation of expert agencies—
indicates that Congress is less enamored than it once was with open-ended tax
expenditures administered solely by the Treasury Department. Congress has
recognized both the need for annual limits on expenditures and the value of
input from an expert agency. This model should be applied to conservation
easements.

106. Id. § 47(c)(2)(B)(iv), (C); see Historic Preservation Certification Application, NAT’L PARK
SERV, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, http://www.nps.gov/hps/TPS/tax/hpcappl.htm.
107. I.R.C. § 51. The designated local agency would be a state employment-security agency. Id. §
51(d)(12)
108. Credit for Production of Low Sulfur Diesel Fuel, id. § 45H (no credit allowed unless
certification obtained from Treasury after consultation with Administrator of Environmental
Protection Agency, id. § 45H(e)); Electricity Produced from Certain Renewable Resources, id. §
45(c)(8)(B)(i) (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission required to certify the amount of “incremental
hydropower production”); Credit for Carbon Dioxide Sequestration, id. § 45Q(d)(2) (requires
consultation with Administrator of Environmental Protection Agency and Secretaries of Energy and
Interior with respect to regulations for determining adequate security measures for storage of carbon
dioxide).
109. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (referring to Land Trust Alliance’s accreditation
process).
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It cannot be claimed that the deduction for conservation easements is
merely a part of the charitable deduction and should not be singled out for
special treatment. Congress recognized forty years ago that charitable
deductions for partial-interest gifts can be easily abused. It crafted narrow
exceptions it hoped would be less troublesome.
Furthermore, Congress recently imposed additional restrictions on
undivided-interest gifts, which should be much less problematic than
conservation easement donations. In the former case, the charitable interest’s
value is clear. The only question is whether the charity, in deference to the
donor, will fail to enforce its rights. With easements, enforcement is definitely
more difficult and expensive, and the scope of the restrictions will often be
murky.
Finally, the evidence of the gift’s value is inadequate. Valuation is based on
the supposed decline in the sales price of the donor’s holdings; this decline
depends upon uncertain future events and the vigor of enforcement. Many
donors have no intention of selling and would view area-wide restrictions as
increasing the property’s value. Thus, they may have given up little of value.
More importantly, we have no evidence that the public benefit is equal to the
estimated decline in selling price. Because the deduction for conservation
easements is the broadest, most unfettered exception to the partial-interest
restriction, special treatment is justified.
A comparison of the current tax-expenditure program’s advantages with
those of direct grants or limited credits shows that the tax-expenditure approach
is clearly inferior. A direct-grant program or a tax credit with an annual ceiling
would force the easement’s recipient to prioritize and acquire only the most
valuable easements. Of course, it would be best if an agency other than the
Treasury selected the beneficiaries. To this end, we now have a number of
examples of credits being allocated to local governments or private entities.
Even if the program is open-ended, Congress should require a government
agency—or a large, diversified land trust meeting strict minimum standards—to
certify the conservation purpose. This certification should express agreement
with the valuation the donor claimed for tax purposes, which should be publicly
disclosed. The easement holder should also be required to have an established
monitoring program and to demonstrate its ability to enforce the easement.
This suggests more-stringent eligibility requirements. The current limitation to
a publicly supported charity, while well intended, is inadequate.
In short, the current system is just not acceptable. We need to find a better
way.

